Parents as Advocates: Examining the History and Evolution of Parents\u27 Rights to Advocate for Children with Disabilities under the IDEA by Mead, Julie F. & Paige, Mark A.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 2
5-1-2008
Parents as Advocates: Examining the History and
Evolution of Parents' Rights to Advocate for
Children with Disabilities under the IDEA
Julie F. Mead
Mark A. Paige
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mead, Julie F. and Paige, Mark A. (2008) "Parents as Advocates: Examining the History and Evolution of Parents' Rights to Advocate
for Children with Disabilities under the IDEA," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 34: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol34/iss2/2
PARENTS AS ADVOCATES:
EXAMINING THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF
PARENTS' RIGHTS TO ADVOCATE FOR CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE IDEA
Julie F. Mead* & Mark A. Paige **
"Parents of handicapped children all too frequently are not able to advocate for the
right of their children because they have been erroneously led to believe that their
children will not be able to lead meaningful lives. However, over the past few years,
parents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children are being
denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It should not, however,
be necessary for parents throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts to
assure themselves a remedy." 
1
As this quotation illustrates, the right of parents to advocate on behalf of their
children with disabilities was an important focus of the initial enactment of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHCA) in 1975. 2  Since that time,
Congress has amended the law four times, 3 including renaming the Act the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990. 4 After each legislative revision, the
Department of Education has issued regulations to implement the latest iteration of the
law. 5
In addition to legislative action affecting parental rights between 1975 and 2006,
the United States Supreme Court has heard ten cases requiring the justices to construe
the IDEA. 6 The resulting opinions have also impacted parents' ability to advocate for
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1. Senate Report Regarding Pub. L. No. 94-142, Education for All Handicapped Children Act, S. REP.
No. 168, at 9 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
3. Handicapped Children Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986); Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990); Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37(1997); Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 104 Stat. 2647 (2004).
4. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, sec. 901, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990).
5. Originally, regulations were promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare at 45
C.F.R. § 121a et seq. In 1980, Congress created the Department of Education and elevated the Secretary of
Education to a cabinet level position. See U.S. Department of Education, The Federal Role in Education,
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last visited April 6, 2007). Since 1980, the regulations have
been found at 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
6. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Honig v
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their child.
Each action, whether statutory, regulatory, or judicial has resulted in progressively
more definition of precisely what rights parents enjoy, and the limitations of those
rights, as they advocate for their children. As such, parental rights under the IDEA have
evolved over time. With the recent 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA 7 and important
Supreme Court decisions on parental rights decided in 2005 and 2006, 8 it is necessary
to fully describe those rights as currently construed and to explore the implications of
the rights and educational opportunities guaranteed for children with disabilities.
This study examines the evolution of parental rights under the IDEA. Specifically,
it examines the question of how those rights have changed since the initial passage of
the EHCA in 1975. 9 In short, the study asks: Do parents today have more, fewer, or
about the same rights to advocate for their children with disabilities when compared to
earlier times? What follows is an examination of that question from a historic
• 10
perspective, beginning with the initial enactment of the law in Part I and proceeding
through four additional periods of development in Parts 11 through V. The patterns that
emerge are then discussed with respect to robustness of parental rights as they exist
today in Part VI. This paper concludes with the implications of those changes for
parents and particularly for the right to equal educational opportunity to which their
children are entitled.
1. THE EAHCA
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) was signed into law in
1975 by President Gerald Ford. Central among the justifications for the enactment of
the EAHCA was the fact that parents often had little recourse other than filing civil
lawsuits in order to obtain educational services for their children with disabilities. As
explained in the Senate Report accompanying the original bill:
Whereas the actions taken at the State and national levels over the past few years
have brought substantial progress, the parents of a handicapped child or a
handicapped child himself must still too often be told that adequate funds do not exist
to assure that child the availability of a free appropriate public education. The courts
have stated that the lack of funding may not be used as an excuse for failing to
provide educational services. Yet, the most recent statistics provided by the Bureau
of Education for the Handicapped estimate that of the more than 8 million children
(between birth and twenty-one years of age) with handicapping conditions requiring
Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Cedar Rapids Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999); Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005); Arlington Cent. School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006), Winkleman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994
(2007).
7. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 104 Stat.
2647 (2004).
8. Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49; Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455.
9. 89 Stat. 73 (1975).
10. For a discussion of the history of the Act in its entirety, see Dixie Snow Huefner, Getting
Comfortable with Special Education Law: A Framework for Working with Children with Disabilities. (2d ed.
2006).
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special education and related services, only 3.9 million such children are receiving an
appropriate education. 1.75 million handicapped children are receiving no
educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped children are receiving an
inappropriate education. 11
In short, the Senate found that when states and local school districts were left to
their own devices, too many provided inadequate or no educational services to children
with disabilities. Congress also recognized that the educational services received by
children with disabilities depended, at least in part, on parents' ability to advocate on
their behalf, up to and including filing legal action to challenge denied educational
services. As such, one purpose of the EAHCA was to protect the rights of children with
disabilities by creating specific procedural protections that their parents could use to
ensure that a free appropriate public education (FAPE)12 is available for each child with
a disability. The specific rights created by the original EAHCA included:
* The right to receive written notice of their rights under the law. 
13
* The right to receive written notice of the school's intent to evaluate for
special education services. 14
* The right to receive written notice of whenever the school initiates a
change of placement or refuses to make a change of placement. 
15
" The right to be a member of any Individualized Education Program
(IEP) 16 Team for their child. 17
* The right to participate in all decisions about their child. 
18
* The right to receive information about their child's progress. 19
* The right to obtain an independent evaluation of their child at public
expense when they disagree with the school's evaluation results.
20
* The right to challenge a school's decisions by filing a complaint which
will be resolved by a hearing before an impartial hearing officer.
2 1
* The right to appeal an administrative decision in a court of law.
22
In addition to these explicit statutory rights, the regulations promulgated to
11. S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 8, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 (1975).
12. FAPE is the central entitlement of the EAHCA and now the IDEA. FAPE was defined by the
EAHCA as: "special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required [for each child with a
disability]." Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2000)).
13. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1)(D) (2000)).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-141, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1)(A) (2000)).
15. Id.
16. The Individualized Education Program (IEP) is a document that delineates the special education and
related services a child with a disability will receive in order to receive FAPE. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2000)).
17. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B)(i)
(2000)).
18. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2000)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2000)).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (2000)).
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implement the EAHCA's provisions conferred six additional related rights:
* The right to grant or deny permission to evaluate their child.
23
* The right to grant or deny permission to provide special education and
related services to their child.
24
* The right to have all evaluation results explained to them.
25
" The right to receive copies of LEPs written for their child. 26
* The right to have information they have independently gathered
considered by school officials. 
27
* The right to invite persons of their choosing to meetings called to discuss
the child and plan for the child.
28
As this list demonstrates, the rights parents enjoyed under the initial language of the
statutes and regulations fell into four broad categories: notice, consent, participation,
and challenge. The notice requirements ensured not only that parents understood when
actions were being taken with respect to their child, but also that they understood their
rights and their child's rights under the law. Interestingly, while the statute does not
specifically use the word "consent," the regulations read the participation sections of the
law to imply that parents must consent before major actions such as evaluation and
placement occur with their child. Participation rights include collaborating with school
personnel to construct their child's IEP and receiving the requisite information
regarding their child's performance to ensure that the participation was meaningful.
Participation in decision-making was so important to the original crafters of the Act that
school officials were specifically barred from making any change in the child's
placement without parental notification and consent. In addition, when the parents
disagreed with the changes contemplated by school officials, the law required that the
status quo be maintained by insisting that the child remain in his or her current
placement until a resolution was reached through the administrative or judicial
procedures outlined in the Act. 29 Finally, the EAHCA provided significant procedures
that created a complaint process for the parents to employ whenever they believed that
the school district was failing in its obligation to provide FAPE to the child. The
primary mechanism, the due process hearing, whereby an impartial third party hears
evidence from both parents and school officials before rendering a decision, was
designed to provide a means to resolve conflicts without resorting to court action. Still,
the law preserved judicial involvement, including a provision which specifically
23. 45 C.F.R. 121a.504(b) (1977).
24. Id.
25. 45 C.F.R. 121a.344(b) (1977).
26. 45 C.F.R. 121a.345(f) (1977).
27. 45 C.F.R. 121a.504(c) (1977).
28. 45 C.F.R. 121a.344(a)(5) (1977).
29. This provision was and is commonly referred to as the "stay-put" provision of the law. Pub. L. No.
94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 14150) (2000)); see infra notes 74-87 and
accompanying text.
30. Considerable judicial activity to compel school districts to serve children with disabilities had
occurred just prior to the enactment of the EAHCA. The two most important cases typically cited are Mills v.
Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)) and Pa. Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). For a discussion of these important cases, see G.M. ZELIN., THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW, (LRP PUBLICATIONS 1993).
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allowed any dissatisfied party to appeal an administrative decision in civil court. 3 1 In
addition, judges were given the explicit authority to fashion "such relief as the court
determines is appropriate" when resolving the issues before them. 32 Taken together,
these important procedural protections created powerful tools for parents as they
advocated for access to public education for their children with disabilities.
II. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
Not surprisingly, as schools implemented the EAHCA, disputes arose between
parents and school districts over the application of its provisions. Judicial interpretation
of the Act then became increasingly necessary to resolve those clashes and clarify the
requirements of the EAHCA. Between 1982 and 1984, the United States Supreme
Court heard four cases to resolve disputes between parents of children with disabilities
and the school districts charged with providing FAPE.33 Each case had a significant
impact on parents' rights under the EAHCA.
A. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley
(1982)
The power of parents to advocate for their children by being an integral part of the
development of a child's special education took root with the Supreme Court's decision
in Board of Education v. Rowley. 34 Two central issues were presented to the court:
First, the Court was asked to decide what constituted a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE) under the EAHCA and, specifically, whether Amy Rowley required
the services of a sign language interpreter in order to obtain it; and, second, the Rowley
court addressed the appropriate role of the judiciary in reviewing special education
matters under a provision in the Act that opened the courts to "any party aggrieved."
35
In response to the first inquiry, the Court held that the law ensured access and a
"basic floor of opportunity," but that the services provided need not maximize a
student's potential. 36 In this way, the Court attempted to strike a pragmatic balance
between what parents may desire for their child and the school's obligation to fund
additional services. The Court also made clear that in making that calculation,
educators were owed a measure of deference as illustrated by the following discussion:
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to
avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The
31. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B)(i)
(2000)).
32. Id.
33. Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468
U.S. 883 (1984); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
That the high Court heard four cases in this time period is impressive. Of course, they represent only the tip
of the judicial iceberg as federal district and appellate courts heard dozens of other cases in the same time
period.
34. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
35. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)
(2000)).
36. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, at 200.
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primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped
child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was
left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents
or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility of
"acquiring and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for
handicapped children significant information derived from educational research,
demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising
educational practices and materials." In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of
appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to [the Act].
37
This leads, of course, to the Court's determination of the second issue-the
appropriate role of the judiciary in special education disputes. Even though the
Rowleys did not prevail in their claim, the Rowley decision strengthened the advocacy
power of parents by ensuring that parents would be included in every aspect of
developing a child's special education. The Rowley Court placed the judicial
imprimatur on the notion that parents were on equal footing in any administrative step
regarding their child's special education. Indeed, Rowley held that procedural
safeguards embedded in EAHCA were intended to ensure that parents and guardians
had "a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process."
38
To resolve a dispute as to whether an education agency complied with these
safeguards, the Court adopted a two-part test.3 9 Under this test, a court considering a
challenge to an IEP must answer the following: First, has the State complied with
procedures under EAHCA; and, second, is the IEP developed through the Act's
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? 40
In sum, while the Rowley Court adopted only an obligation of a district to provide
FAPE that provided some educational benefit, 4 1 it did underscore the point that
Congress intended parents to be essential players in the procedural development of a
student's special education. 4 2 Thus, Rowley represents a significant step in the growth
of parental advocacy strength because the Court's holding left no question that parents
were central-and their involvement was congressionally required-at every step of the
IEP administrative process. 43 In essence, it established a secure foothold for parents to
negotiate with school officials over what was appropriate for their child.
B. Tatro v. Irving Independent School District (1984)
The ability of parents to advocate for their children through use of the federal
courts was strengthened after Tatro v. Irving Independent School District, where the
37. Id. at 207-08.
38. Id. at 205.
39. Id. at 206-07.
40. Id.
41. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201




Court set forth a test to define what constituted "related services" for special education
purposes.44 At issue was whether clean intermittent catheterization constituted a related
service under the EHCA. 45  The Court sided with the parents and found the
catheterization was a related service within the meaning of the EAHCA.
46
The Tatro decision strengthened the hand of parents as advocates in two ways.
First, as previously mentioned, the Court set forth a two-part test to determine if a
service constituted a "related service" under the IDEA. 47 That test requires a court to
ask whether a particular service is a supportive service within the meaning of related
service-that is that the service is necessary for the child to benefit from special
education-and, also, if that service is excluded from the definition as a "medical
service" for purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation. 48 In ruling for the parents, the
Court adopted a bright line test for determining whether a service fell under the medical
exclusion. Namely, if the service required a doctor it was medically excluded, and if it
did not it constituted a related service for which schools were responsible under the
Act.
49
The adoption of the bright line test with respect to the medical exclusion language
of the EHCA was a significant victory for parents of children with disabilities. Under
the applicable language of the Act, a school was required to provide "medical services"
only for the purposes of diagnosis.50 The District argued that the catheterization was
not a related service because it was a medical service for purposes other than diagnosis,
and was excluded accordingly under the medical exclusion provision of EHCA.5 1 The
Court, affirming the Court of Appeals' ruling on the matter, refused the invitation and
adopted a bright line test to adjudicate future medical exclusion disputes. A medical
exclusion, held the Court, would narrowly be applied only to services required to be
administered by a licensed physician. 52  Simply because a service was medical in
nature, such as the catheterization at hand, would not release a district from its
obligation to provide the service, so long as it qualified as a "related service."
53
In a second way, Tatro enhanced the advocacy power of parents. Specifically, the
courts became available to parents as a venue to challenge a school's determination of
what constituted a "related service" under special education law. The district's claim
that a court was limited to adjudicating only the procedural complaints asserted by
parents in Rowley was rejected. The court carved out its adjudicative territory on
educational service issues when it wrote: "Judicial review is equally appropriate in this
case [as in Rowley], which presents the legal question of a school's substantive
obligation under 'related services' requirements" of EAHCA.54  In sum, reading
Rowley and Tatro together, parents could seek judicial relief with respect to both state
44. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891.
45. Id. at 890.
46. Id. at 891.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 890.
49. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891.
50. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1977)) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 887.
52. Id. at 892.
53. Id.
54. Tatro, 458 U.S. at 890 n.6.
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procedural compliance with the EAHCA and also a determination of the more
substantive issue of what constituted "special education and related services" necessary
to achieve an appropriate education under the EAHCA.
55
C. Smith v. Robinson (1984)
Parental advocacy strength suffered something of a setback after Smith v.
Robinson. 56 First, the Court narrowed the applicable legal avenues under which parents
could assert claims that a district violated its constitutional obligation to provide a
public education for handicapped children. The Smith Court held that the
comprehensive scheme of protections codified in EAHCA were the "exclusive" avenues
through which parents must seek relief for claims of violations of their child's right to
FAPE under the EAHCA or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
57
In Smith, the parent-plaintiffs asserted multiple legal claims arising from the same
nucleus of facts. They argued that the school district's failure to provide FAPE for their
child at once violated the EHCA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 58 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 The federal district court
ruled for the parents as a matter of state law and, therefore, never reached the federal
statutory or constitutional questions. However, the Court held that parents of a child
served under the EAHCA were barred from bringing a complaint to federal court under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Fourteenth Amendment without first
exhausting the remedies available to them through the procedures of the EAHCA.
6 1
Echoing their decision in Rowley that emphasized Congressional intent in interpreting
the EAHCA, the Court wrote that:
6 2
[W]here the EHA is available to a handicapped child asserting a right to a free
appropriate public education, based either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through
S •63
which the child and his parents or guardians can pursue their claim.
Secondly, Smith constrained parental rights by foreclosing any opportunity for
parents to recover attorneys' fees accrued when asserting a claim for a publicly funded
special education. 64 The parents in Smith argued that fee-shifting provisions under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Civil Rights Act applied to the EAHCA. 65 They contended
that, under existing law, plaintiffs would be able to recover attorneys' fees when
55. Id.
56. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
57. Id. at 1013.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (prohibiting recipients of federal assistance from discriminating on the basis
of disability).
59. Smith, 468 U.S. at 995.
60. Id. at 1000-01.
61. Id. at 1012-13.
62. Id. at 995.
63. Id. at 1013.
64. Smith, 468 U.S. at 993.
65. Id. at 1003-05.
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substantial claims under the aforementioned Acts were asserted by the plaintiffs but not
addressed by the court. However, the Court disagreed and simply noted that the
EAHCA did not include a fee-shifting provision as a remedy available to parents.
66
Thus, while Rowley and Tatro offered some assurance that the courts would oversee
compliance with the EAHCA's procedural mechanisms, the Court's holding in Smith
meant that it could be a costly enterprise to seek such oversight. Moreover, without the
fee-shifting provision, it could be argued that Smith created something of a chilling
effect on the willingness of attorneys to take EAHCA cases.
D. School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education (1988)
Interestingly, while the Court was unwilling to read the EAHCA to include
recovery of attorneys' fees as a remedy to a school district's denial of FAPE, the
opposite result was reached in relation to the reimbursement of private school tuition in
School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education.67  In Burlington, the
Court decided whether, under the EAHCA, judges could properly order a school district
to reimburse parents for private school tuition when the private school provided
appropriate educational services and the public school's proposed IEP was
inappropriate. 68 First, in a unanimous opinion, the Court held that a court could order a
district to repay parents for private tuition if the private school placement is undertaken
to obtain FAPE for the child.69  As the Court explained, "the Town repeatedly
characterizes reimbursement as "damages," but that simply is not the case.
Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have
paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper
IEP."
70
Second, the Court continued to hold its position that the courts were appropriate
venues for parents to seek relief with respect to tuition reimbursement. According to
the Court, Congress granted the judiciary wide latitude in fashioning appropriate relief
for aggrieved parents under the Act. Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion,
noted that: "The statute directs the court to 'grant such relief as [it] determines
appropriate.' The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the
court."
' 7 1
Thus, the Burlington decision is noteworthy not just for the holding that parents
could obtain reimbursement for private school under certain circumstances, but also for
reiterating that they could use the judiciary to seek such relief.
III. EAHCA GROWS IN THE IDEA
The next period examined extends from 1986 through 1993. During this eight-year
period, Congress amended the Act twice and the Supreme Court heard two more
66. Id. at 1017.
67. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
68. Id.
69. id. at 369.
70. Id. at 370-71.
71. Id. at 370.
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important special education cases.
A. Handicapped Children Protection Act of 1986
What the Court limited in Smith, Congress provided through its first substantive
revision of the EAHCA, the Handicapped Children Protection Act (HCPA). 72 Passed
in 1986, the HCPA made only one revision to the Act: the addition of a fee-shifting
provision that allows parents to recover attorneys' fees expended in the course of
successfully advocating for their child's right to FAPE. As the Senate explained in its
report:
The situation which has resulted from the Smith v. Robinson decision was
summarized by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in their dissenting opinion:
"Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter." Seeking to clarify the
intent of Congress with respect to the educational rights of handicapped children
guaranteed by the EHA, the Handicapped Children's Protection Act . . . was
introduced. 
73
This provision, which still exists in the current version of the Act, allows parents to
recover reasonable attorneys' fees when they prevail in a challenge against school
officials. It includes provisions to limit those fees if the parents reject a settlement offer
substantially the same as the eventual judicial decision, if parents unreasonably protract
the conflict, or if the attorneys' hourly rates are deemed excessive in comparison to
community standards. 74 Clearly the HCPA marked a significant victory for parents in
asserting their children's rights to an appropriate public education.
B. Honig v Doe (1988)
The balance of power continued to shift toward parents following Honig v. Doe.
75
In Honig, parents challenged indefinite suspensions of their children for disciplinary
infractions during pendency of administrative hearings regarding the underlying
disputes. At issue for the Court was whether the district's actions violated the "stay-
put" provision of the EAHCA. 76  The provision reads that a child with a disability
"shall remain in his or her then current educational placement" pending the review of
any proceedings unless both the parents and the local education agency agree to alter
that placement. 77 Parents of the children contended that the extended suspension of
their children during their challenges to proposed expulsions violated the stay-put
provision. 78  In their defense, the school district urged the Court to adopt a
"dangerousness" exception to the "stay-put" provision that would permit school districts
72. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat 796 (1986).
73. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799.
74. Pub. L.No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F) (2000)).
75. Honig v Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
76. Id. at 308.
77. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §1415(0) (2000)).
78. Honig, 484 U.S. at 314-16.
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to extend suspension during the expulsion process when the district determines a
student would pose a threat at the school or an alternative placement. 
79
The Court concurred with the parents. The Court held that Congress was clear in
its adoption of the stay-put provision and its purpose to redress the once unimpeded
ability of a district to remove a special education student from a school setting without
meaningful parental input. The Court wrote, "[w]e think it clear, however, that
Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had
traditionally employed to exclude disabled students from school."
81
Indeed, the Court reasoned that the EAHCA's stay-put provision was a crucial tool
in reducing a school's almost unbridled power to remove special needs children from a
classroom and balancing the relationship between a school and parents. In explaining
this relationship, the Court noted that the EAHCA "provided for meaningful parental
participation in all aspects of a child's educational placement, and barred schools,
through the stay-put provision, from changing that placement over the parent's
objection until all review proceedings were completed."' 82 At the heart of enacting the
EAHCA was a Congressional intent to include parents as central players in the
development of their child's special education. Continuing on this theme, the Court
wrote that "[C]ongress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance and
indeed the necessity of parental participation" in creating and assessing an IEP.
83
Furthermore, in continuing to underscore the centrality of parents in the
development and assessment of a child's special education, the Honig Court also read
the stay-put provision to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the child's current
educational placement when a district seeks injunctive relief from the courts in a change
of placement matter. 84  Thus, in sum, Honig foreclosed any self-help remedy for
districts. It required that, prior to a change in placement, parents must be afforded their
statutory right to participate in such discussions and any review proceedings, and
created a legal presumption in favor of the child's current placement. 85 That said, the
Court reminded school districts that they were not "powerless" to deal with students
they believed threatened the safety of the school community. 86 First, removals of less
than ten days did not constitute a change in placement and therefore could be
unilaterally effected without parental input or consent. 87  Second, the Court noted
schools could employ the due process procedures of the Act or seek injunctive relief in
a court of law. 88 Still, Honig stands as a stem judicial reminder of the vitality of
parental rights under federal disability law.
79. Id. at 317.
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
84. Id. at 328.
85. Id. at 324.
86. Id. at 306.
87. Id.
88. Honig, 484 U.S. at 307.
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C. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990
In 1990, the EAHCA was amended for the second time and in so doing, renamed
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 89 While many of the changes might be
characterized as cosmetic in that the term "handicapped child" was removed from the
Act's lexicon and replaced with the term "child with a disability," more substantive
changes were also made. While none directly impacted the parental rights first
enumerated under the original Act, the added requirements, that IEPs plan for the
transition from high school to post-school life for older children 90 and include "assistive
technology" 91 if needed as a part of special education and related services, can be read
to increase parental rights simply because they impact children's rights in positive ways.
In addition, the regulations promulgated to implement the IDEA appear to grow in
sophistication and employ considerable commentary to assist state and local officials in
interpreting their obligations. One interesting note appears, appearing in the 1993
version of the regulations that appears, seems to limit parental rights by suggesting that
situations may occur where the exercise of parental preferences may negatively
implicate a child's right to FAPE. In relation to a denial of parental consent, provisions
of the 1993 regulations read as follows:
If there is no State law requiring consent before a child with a disability is evaluated
or initially provided special education and related services, the public agency may use
the hearing procedures in Secs.§§ 300.506-300.508 to determine if the child may be
evaluated or initially provided special education and related services without parental
consent. If it does so and the hearing officer upholds the agency, the agency may
evaluate or initially provide special education and related services to the child without
the parent's consent ....
The regulations further provided:
[A] State may require parental consent for other services and activities under this part
if it ensures that each public agency in the State establishes and implements effective
procedures to ensure that a parent's refusal to consent does not result in a failure to
provide the child with FAPE.
93
What is more, a question and answer appendix to the regulations included the
following example in response to a question about "what steps should be followed" if
the parents and school officials cannot agree about an IEP:
A child in the regular fourth grade has been evaluated and found to be eligible for
special education. The agency and the parents agree that the child has a specific
89. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42 (1990).
90. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34) (2000)).
91. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (2000)).
92. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b)(3) (1993).
93. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(c) (1993).
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learning disability. However, one party proposes placement in a self-contained
program, and the other proposes placement in a resource room. Agreement cannot be
reached and a due process hearing is initiated. Unless the parents and the agency
agree otherwise, the child would remain in the regular fourth grade until the issue is
resolved.
On the other hand, since the child's need for special education is not in question, both
parties might agree-as an interim measure-[to a temporary placement].
94
This construction of an override procedure when parental consent is refused was an
interesting addition to the regulations. As will be explained later, a school district's
options when parents deny consent would continue to evolve in subsequent versions of
the Act and its regulations.
D. Florence County School District Four v. Carter (1993)
In Florence County School District Four v. Carter,95 parental rights reached their
judicial highpoint and even began to show some signs of waning. In Carter, the Court
was asked to resolve the issue as to whether parents could be reimbursed for private
school tuition when the district did not provide FAPE and the parents removed their
child to a school that did not meet the state approved education standards. 96 Extending
its thinking in Burlington, the Court held that as long as the parental placement provided
the FAPE denied by the school district's defective IEP, reimbursement was allowable. 
97
Although the parents prevailed in obtaining full reimbursement, the Court was
careful to narrow its holding. Indeed, foreshadowing some contraction of parental
rights under the IDEA, the Court set forth restrictions on entitlement to reimbursement.
First, parents could receive reimbursement "only" if a federal court held that public
placement violated the IDEA and that the private placement was appropriate under the
law. 98 Second, the Court suggested that judges had the equitable power to tailor the
amount of reimbursement in cases where a public placement violated the IDEA, but the
cost of the private placement was "unreasonable."
99
IV. THE IDEA EXPANDS
The last part of the 1990s saw considerable expansion of the IDEA and of parents'
rights under its provisions. Most notable in this time period was the enactment of
substantial revisions to the Act in 1997. The Supreme Court also clarified its Tatro
ruling in a case involving one-on-one nursing services.
94. Appendix C to 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. C (1993) (Question 35).
95. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
96. Id. at 129.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 16.
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A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997
The 1997 amendments made to the IDEA [hereinafter IDEA 1997] affected nearly
every provision of the Act in some way. With regard to parental fights, a close reading
of both the statute signed on June 4, 1997 by President Bill Clinton and the 1999
regulations promulgated to implement the changes can only be read as an enhancement
of parental fights under the law. In fact, Congress declared:
Over 20 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of
children with disabilities can be made more effective by ... strengthening the role of
parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at home. 100
Congress accomplished that strengthening in several ways that impacted the
domains of each of the four main fights' domains: notice, consent, participation, and
complaint. In relationship to the notice requirements, new statutory and regulatory
language was added (1) to specify precisely what content must be included in a notice
of rights to parents; 101 (2) to require that notice be given whenever a child is referred
for evaluation, an IEP team meeting is convened, the child is re-evaluated for special
education eligibility or whenever the parent files a complaint under the Act; 102 and (3)
that the language used be easily understandable to parents. 103 With regard to parental
consent, while new statutory language merely codified earlier regulations, new
regulatory language appeared to back away from an override procedure when consent is
refused. Although the regulations retain the override provision when parents refuse an
evaluation, no mention is made of the school's authority to use the same procedures if
consent to services is denied. 104
The major area of parental rights impacted by IDEA 1997 involved parents'
participation in decision-making. A new section defines who must be on an IEP team,
and lists parents first, in order to clarify their role in the process. 105  The added
requirement that a regular classroom teacher be on most IEP teams can also be read to
positively impact parental rights, 106 as it provides parents a mechanism by which not
only to gather input from those teachers, but to ensure that the teachers are aware of the
IEP and how it is to be implemented in regular classrooms. Likewise, the creation of a
legal presumption that children with disabilities must be educated with their non-
disabled peers unless evidence demonstrates that the child needs something else in order
to obtain FAPE strengthens parents' hand when advocating for inclusive placements. 107
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (1997).
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (1997).
102. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1997).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) & (d)(2) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 300.504-505 (1997).
104. 34 C.F.R. § 300. 505 (1997).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(1) (1997).
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(2) (1997).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(4) (1997).; see also Julie F. Mead,




The new evaluation and IEP provisions required: (1) that parental input be gathered as
part of any evaluation;l°8 (2) for the first time, "measurable" annual goals 109; (3) that
copies of IEPs are to be given as a matter of course rather than upon "request;" 110 (4)
that children with disabilities are to be included on any state or district-wide
assessments of academic performance; I and (5) required that parents of children with
disabilities be given information on student progress as often as parents of non-disabled
children, and specifies that that such information specifically include the child's
progress include advancement ontoward IEP goals.112 Each of these additions can all
be read to enhance parental participation rights, by providing mechanisms to keep
parents better informed about their child's education and its effectiveness. In addition, a
provision was added to clarify that charter schools must comply with the IDEA, thus
making it clear that parents of disabled children enjoy the same rights as other parents to
enroll their children with disabilities in charter schools as do other parents. 113
Parents' rights to participate in the placement decisions regarding their children
with disabilities were also negatively impacted by the 1997 amendments. Just as the
HCPA constituted a congressional response to the Supreme Court in Smith, the
discipline provisions of IDEA 1997 were a response to the Court's ruling in Honig.l1
4
The construction of section 1415(k) marked the first time the IDEA contained any
language with regard to how a school's disciplinary authority intersected with special
education delivery and students' rights. Codifying the Honig ruling, school authorities
were granted the authority to remove children from their placements for up to ten days
without it constituting a change of placement that triggered parental procedural
rights. 115 However, Congress essentially created the dangerousness exception found
absent in Honig by granting school officials the unilateral authority to remove a child
for up to forty-five days to an interim altemative educational setting as a consequence
for bringing a gun, any other weapon, or drugs to school. 116  In addition, school
officials were given the authority to seek an order for a forty-five day removal through
an expedited hearing process if they present "substantial" evidence that a child is a
likely danger to self or to others. 117 Parents retained three important rights in these
statutory and regulatory disciplinary provisions. First, they could challenge any forty-
five day removal through due process procedures through an expedited due process
review. 118 Second, regulations recognized that cumulative suspensions could constitute
a change of placement, in which case all procedural protections, including parental
rights, would apply. 119 Finally, and most importantly, the law crafted a process for
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.535(a)(1) (1997).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2) (1997).
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(B)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(f) (1997).
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(v) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(5) (1997).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(viii)(II)(aa) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(7)(ii)(A) (1997).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(5)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.241 (1999).
114. See Mead, supra note 106, at 520.
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a)(1)(i) (1999).
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(ii)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (a)(2) (1999).
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a) (1999).
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.525(a) (1999).
119. 34 C.F.R. § 300.519 (1999).
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determining when misbehavior is actually a manifestation of the disability. 120 Parents
retained their rights to be involved in this process that implicates the placement of their
child 12 1 and, in fact, the law created a rebuttable legal presumption that the misbehavior
was a related to the disability unless school personnel could demonstrate otherwise. 
122
By creating this presumption, the default position would be that the child would escape
expulsion for any misbehavior unless officials clearly demonstrated that the disability
played no substantial role in the offense. So even when parents' rights to participate in
some placement decisions were sharply curtailed, they were not completely excised
from the process.
Parental rights related to complaints were also altered by IDEA 1997. The most
significant change was the addition of a voluntary mediation process. 123 This change
arguably has mixed effects on parental rights. On the positive side, mediation is
designed to be less adversarial and less costly to both parties. Still, since mediation can
result in a settlement agreed to by both parties, it is possible that parents may agree to a
result that does not fully address all their rights or those of their child. In addition to the
mediation provisions, other new provisions related to complaints specify what must be
in a notice of complaint to the school district. 124 For example, parents could no longer
simply lodge a complaint, they had to describe the "nature of the problem," the "facts of
the problem," and "a proposed resolution."' 125 Finally, new language also placed new
limitations on the recovery of attorneys' fees. 126 Specifically, even prevailing parents
in any dispute could no longer recover fees associated with attendance at an IEP
meeting unless that meeting was ordered by a hearing officer or judge or if the attorney
failed to assist the parents to provide the requisite notice to the school district about the
nature of the complaint. 
127
In summary, the number of new provisions implicating parental rights in IDEA
1997 can only be described as significant and predominantly, if not overwhelmingly
positive enhancements to the rights enjoyed under earlier iterations of the law.
B. Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. (1999)
A parent's advocacy power advanced once again following Cedar Rapids
Community School District v. Garret F. in 1999,128 where the court reaffirmed its Tatro
decision. In Garret, the Court included as a qualified related service under the IDEA
one-on-one nursing support for a student dependent on a ventilator. 129  The Court
reaffirmed its two-part Tatro test for determining whether a service was a related
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523-524 (1999).
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(b) (1999).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c) (1999). For a discussion, see generally
Mead, supra note 106.
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1999).
124. 20 U.S.C, § 1415(b)(7) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(c) (1999).
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(c) (1999).
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (c)(2) (1999).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (c)(2) (1999).




service. 130 In doing so, the Court rejected the school district's argument that a multi-
factor test that included including the financial burden on the district, and the nature and
extent of the services themselves should be adopted in detennining a district's
obligations with respect to related services. 131
Moreover, the bargaining hand of parents with special needs children, especially
those who required more costly related services, was strengthened under Garret F.
because of the court's rejection of the district's attempt to create an "undue burden"
exception for providing related services. 132 The Court recognized a cost on districts for
providing related services in certain cases, but in its rejection of the district's argument,
it noted that because the IDEA's related services provision:
does not employ cost in its definition of "'related services' or excluded 'medical
services," accepting the District's cost-based standard as the sole test for determining
the scope of the provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without
any guidance from Congress. It would also create some tension with the purposes of
the IDEA. The statute may not require public schools to maximize the potential of
disabled students commensurate with the opportunities provided to other children,
and the potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to
arriving at a sensible construction of the IDEA. But Congress intended "to open the
door of public education" to all qualified children and "required participating States
to educate handicapped children with non-handicapped children whenever
possible." 133
Further, parental advocacy power was strengthened in Tatro through the Court's
reaffirmation of its bright line position regarding the exclusion of a related service on
the grounds that it was a medical exemption. Under the medical exemption for related
services, a district would not have be required to provide the service under the IDEA
only if that service required a physician. 134 In other words, the Court's bright line test
foreclosed school districts from using the medical exemption provision for services that
fell within a more broad definition of the term. According to the Court, the term
medical services, with respect to the exclusionary language under the IDEA "does not
embrace forms of care that might loosely be described as 'medical' in other
contexts.... ' 135 Importantly, the bright line and strict "physician-only" test makes it
more difficult for districts to exercise an exemption in any border-line case where a
medical service can be provided by other medical professionals or staff, such as a nurse.
In sum, because Garret F. broadened what constituted a related service under the IDEA
to include continuous care, notwithstanding consideration of cost as the sole
determinant, and simultaneously limited the medical exemption for a related service, the
bargaining strength of parents, especially those with children who required more
extensive care, was strengthened. Indeed, Garrett F. closed any possible "loopholes"
130. Id. at 73.
131. Id. at 75.
132. Id. at 77-79.
133. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 77-78 (internal citations omitted).
134. Id. at 76.
135. Id. at 74.
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with which a district might use to exempt themselves from providing a related service
necessary to a student's special education.
V. LIMITING THE IDEA
If the 1990s could be characterized as largely expanding parental rights through
legislative and judicial activity, the first decade of the twenty-first century may well
mark the point at which the pendulum shifted toward more moderated entitlements.
Thus far, the decade has seen another major revision to the IDEA and two important
Supreme Court cases which both affirmed the school districts' positions in relation to
parental rights.
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of2004
The 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004,136 continued the evolution of parental rights of advocacy.
As with the 1997 version, provisions implicated parental rights in both positive and
negative ways with regard to notice, consent, participation, and complaint. Rights
related to notice only changed slightly by reducing the number of times school districts
must provide actual copies of the rights to parents. Now, parents only need to be
provided rights upon initial referral for evaluation, whenever a complaint is filed, when
the disciplinary removal sections of the Act are invoked or upon parental request. 137
While it is unknown whether this change will have any practical effect, reducing the
school district's requirements to notify parents of their rights is at least nominally a
reduction in the right to notice itself. In contrast, parents' rights were enhanced by new
language in both the statute and regulation enhanced parents' rights by precluding the
use of due process procedures to override parental refusal to grant consent for the initial
provision of special education and related services was added to both the statute and
regulation, 138 thus settling an issue that first surfaced in the 1990 regulations.
Like the 1997 amendments, the 2004 revisions impacted parents' right to
participate in the evaluation and programming decisions of their children. Five
important changes relate to the IEP and the IEP team and appear to have mixed, if not
negative, impact on parental rights. First, the law no longer requires short term
objectives or benchmarks unless the child will not participate in general state and local
assessments, 139 though the law still requires that the IEP include "how progress will be
measured." 140 Second, the requirement that progress be reported to parents at least as
often as progress is reported about children without disabilities has been was deleted. 141
Third, new language allows IEP team members to be excused from meeting attendance
if they are not needed or if attendance is not possible, but the member submits written
136. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647 (2004).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(d) (1999).
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(D)(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b) (1999).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2) (1999).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2) (1999).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(2) (1999).
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input to other team members. 142 In either case, written parental approval for the
absence of the member must be secured; 143 however, it raises the question of whether
parents will have sufficient information to participate fully in decision-making if not all
team members are present. In addition, it will be important to examine the
implementation of these sections to ensure that parents, who may not fully understand
how IEP Teams work and their rights under the law, are not pressured to excuse team
members as a convenience to school personnel. Fourth, IEPs may now be amended
informally without an IEP Team meeting. 144 As the regulations explain:
(i) In making changes to a child's IEP after the annual IEP Team meeting for a school
year, the parent of a child with a disability and the public agency may agree not to
convene an IEP Team meeting for the purposes of making those changes, and instead
may develop a written document to amend or modify the child's current IEP. (ii) If
changes are made to the child's IEP in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this
section, the public agency must ensure that the child's IEP Team is informed of those
changes. 145
There is much left unanswered by this section. Who will represent the agency in
such a change? May any team member do so? If one member of the team and the
parent agree to a change and another member of the team disagrees with that alteration,
would the change have to be rescinded until the entire team could meet? Still, this
change could make life easier for both parents and teachers by streamlining the process
and reducing the need for meetings. On the other hand, this change has the potential to
diminish parental participation in the child's programming, by limiting the information
available to the parent concerning the proposed changes and their implications. Finally,
the law now includes provisions for a limited number of demonstration projects to
explore the possibility of multi-year IEPs. 146 While each of these changes was enacted
in order to try to reduce the burden of meetings and paperwork on school personnel,
especially teachers, whether these changes will positively or negatively impact parental
rights and their ability to meaningfully participate in the IEP process remains to be seen.
Parents' rights to participate in decision-making about their child were also
implicated by the revised discipline section of IDEA 2004. Three major changes in the
provisions were made to the law, all of which negatively impact the rights enjoyed by
parents under the previous version. First, gone is the presumption that favors the child
whenever agreement cannot be reached conceming whether an offense is a
manifestation of a child's disability. 14 7  The old language allowed the team to
determine the absence of a relationship "only if' evidence supported that conclusion. 1
48
Now the language requires that:
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(e) (1999).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(e) (1999).
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(F) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4) (1999).
145. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4) (1999).
146. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e) (1999).
148. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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[W]ithin 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a child with a
disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct, the local educational
agency, the parent, and relevant members of the IEP Team (as determined by the
parent and the local educational agency) shall review all relevant information in the
student's file, including the child's IEP, any teacher observations, and any relevant
information provided by the parents to determine-
(I) if the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial
relationship to, the child's disability; or
(II) if the conduct in question was the direct result of the local educational
agency's failure to implement the IEP.
(ii) MANIFESTATION- If the local educational agency, the parent, and relevant
members of the IEP Team determine that either subclause (1) or (II) of clause (i) is
applicable for the child, the conduct shall be determined to be a manifestation of the
child's disability. 4
Moreover, school districts may now unilaterally remove a child for inflicting
"serious bodily injury" in addition to weapon and drug offenses. 150 Finally, long term
removals to an interim alternative educational setting for one of these three offenses
may now occur for forty-five school days, rather than forty-five calendar days. 151 Read
together, these three changes to the disciplinary section of the law clearly advantage the
school district over the parent whenever the two parties disagree about the propriety of
consequences proposed for the misbehavior of a child with a disability.
One final change may impact parental rights in a positive way. Just as the charter
school provision added in 1997 opened up choices for parents, a new provision related
to private school placements have the potential to improve services for children placed
in private schools by their parents. The provisions do not explicitly change anything for
parents of such children, but for the first time create a mechanism for private school
personnel to challenge local school districts concerning the delivery of special education
services in that context. 152  Theoretically, at least, by providing this new appellate
procedure, private school officials may be able to use the IDEA to improve the quality
and number of services provided to children with disabilities in their schools. As such,
they would be acting not only on behalf of the children with disabilities enrolled in the
private school, but also the parents who enrolled them there.
Six provisions effected substantive changes to parents' right to file complaints in
relation to their child's education and only one of them can be construed to enhance
previously enjoyed rights. That provision makes clear that any settlement agreement
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(g)(3) (1999).
151. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(g)(3) (1999).
152. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.130-144 (1999).
[Vol. 34:2
Parents as Advocates
entered into as a result of mediation is enforceable by a court of law. 153 The remaining
sections all appear to limit parents' right to present complaints in some way. For
example, the law now sets two years as the statute of limitations for any complaint
where no limitation existed previously. 154 In addition, parents who do complain must
now submit to an additional process called a "resolution session" as a means to try to
diminish the number of complaints that proceed to a full hearing. 155 If a hearing is
held, a new provision instructs hearing officers and reviewing judges that parents may
not prevail on the basis of procedural errors alone. 156 Rather, a finding that FAPE was
denied may only occur if evidence demonstrates that procedural errors affected the
substance of the programming received or "significantly impeded the parents'
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process."1 57 Recalling that attorney's
fees are only available to "prevailing" parties who demonstrate that FAPE was denied,
this provision will likely have the effect of reducing awards of attorneys' fees for
parents. Furthermore, new provisions structure limitations on recovery in two
instances: (1) whenever parents do not give ten day notice to school officials specifying
their dissatisfaction prior to removing the child from the public setting and enrolling
him or her in a private school, a new provision directs that reimbursement of tuition
costs may be reduced; 158 and (2) if a court finds that a complaint brought by parents is
frivolous or brought for some other improper purpose, courts may order parents to pay
the state's costs incurred in answering the complaint. 159 Both of these provisions have
the potential to create a chilling effect on parents inclined to carry forward disputes.
The collective effect of the changes made in 2004 seems to advantage school
officials at the expense of parental rights to serve as advocates, when compared with the
1997 version of the law. It is, however, too early to know how much those rights have
been curtailed in practice.
B. Schaffer v. Weast (2005)
In 2005, the Supreme Court heard its eighth IDEA case, Schaffer v Weast. 160 After
Schaffer, parents face an additional hurdle in any challenge to their child's IEP. The
Court stated the issue in Schaffer as the following: "At an administrative hearing to
assess the appropriateness of an IEP, which party bears the burden of persuasion?"'
6
'
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor applied the generally accepted rule of
evidence that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. In contrast to
previous decisions where the Court readily interpreted a congressional intent that
• . 162
favored the parents' positions, no such intent was apparent with respect to the burden
153. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(6) (1999).
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.51 1(e) (1999).
155. 20 U.S.C. §.1415(f)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.510 (2006).
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.513 (2006).
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.513 (2006).
158. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.148(d) (2006).
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I1-III) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §300.517(a)(1)(ii-iii) (2006).
160. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
161. Id. at 54.
162. See, e.g., Burlington and Carter, infra.
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of proof in determining the adequacy of an IEP. 163
In fact, with respect to parental rights vis-A-vis schools, Justice O'Connor shifted
the balance of power toward schools and away from parents by emphasizing that
schools are in a better position to make educational decisions. For example, she noted
that the IDEA "relies heavily upon the expertise of school districts to meet its goals."1
64
In part based on this expertise, she rejects the parents' argument and the previous
holdings of several circuit courts of appeals 165 that there should be a presumption
against a district in a challenge to an IEP. Justice O'Connor wrote that "[p]etitioners in
effect ask this Court to assume that every IEP is invalid until the school district
demonstrates that it is not. The act does not support this conclusion."
166
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion suggests that parental rights
under the IDEA are sufficient to ensure alignment with the Congressional intent of
providing FAPE to all children. She cites several regulations under the IDEA relied
upon in reaching her conclusion, including provisions that permit parents to access
experts and to evaluate information, and require school districts to disclose expert
information. 167 Indeed, Justice O'Connor reaches back to Rowley to conclude that
parents essentially have sufficient protections under the procedural safeguards
embedded in the IDEA. 168 Directly citing Rowley, she writes that: "Congress appears
to have presumed instead that, if the Act's procedural requirements are respected,
parents will prevail when they have legitimate grievances."' 169 Ironically, while the
Court used Rowley as a starting point to establish parental rights and power to advocate,
Schaffer uses that same reasoning to effectively halt further growth in parents' struggle
to equalize a perceived power differential in relation to school authorities.
C. Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy (2006)
Parental bargaining strength further diminished when the Supreme Court made its
ruling in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy. 170 At issue
was whether the plaintiff-parents could be reimbursed by the school district for
educational expert fees that totaled over $29,000 under the IDEA fee-shifting
provisions. 171 In pertinent part, the IDEA provides that a court "may award reasonable
attorneys' fees as part of the costs" to prevailing parents. 172 In a five-to-four opinion
authored by Justice Alito, the Court declined to extend this provision to include
reimbursement to parents for costs incurred for hiring experts. 1
73
Justice Alito's opinion addressed squarely the parents' argument that the
163. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57.




168. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60.
169. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
170. Id. at 2458.
171. Id. at 2458
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
173. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2457.
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overarching goals of the IDEA to enhance parental advocacy rights supported a finding
that expert fees are recoverable for prevailing parents. Unpersuaded by that argument,
Justice Alito's opinion found this legislative objective far too broad to be applied in this
case, especially when considering the potential financial impact on districts if a decision
were rendered in favor of the parents. For the Court, Alito wrote, "[t]hese goals,
however, are too general to provide much support for respondents' reading of the terms
of IDEA. The IDEA obviously does not seek to promote these goals at the expense of
all other considerations, including fiscal considerations." 
174
Furthermore, the Court dispensed with the parents' argument that Congressional
intent supported a finding that prevailing parents could recover expert fees. 175 In
support of their argument, the parents in Murphy pointed to the House and Senate
Conference Report concerning the EHA. The Conference report stated plainly: "The
conferees intent that the term attorneys' fees as part of the costs include reasonable
expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation
which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the .. .case. '176 The parents
argued that the adoption of the word "intent" by the conferees in their report settled the
issue of expert fee reimbursement.
The majority of the Court rejected the parent's legislative "intent" argument.
Despite the conferees adoption of the word "intent," the Court's opinion determined that
this report reflected a legislative history of the IDEA, rather than legislative intent.
177
In the larger "historical" context, the singular adoption by the conferees of the word
"intent" was insufficient to find that expert fees were recoverable. This conclusion was
especially true, the Court reasoned, in a case covered by the Spending Clause-which
Murphy was, according to the Court-where states must be "clearly told the conditions
that go along with the acceptance" of funds. 178 The IDEA, according to the holding in
Murphy, did not give clear notice to the states because text of the Act itself did not
include a provision for recovery of expert fees for the prevailing party. 179 Thus, the
court refused to construe the IDEA as permitting recovery for expert fees. 
180
D. Winkleman v. Parma (2007)
Discussion of the evolution of parental rights would be incomplete without
accounting for the most recent iteration of those rights found in Winkleman v.
Parma. 181 The issue facing the Court was stated as "whether parents, either on their
own behalf or as representatives of the child, may proceed in court unrepresented by
counsel through they are not trained or licensed as attorneys." 1
82
By way of factual history, the parents in this case initially challenged a proposed
IEP for their son who has autism. The parents were unsuccessful at the initial
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1807, 1808.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2457.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 127 S. Ct. 1994.
182. Id. at 1998.
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administrative hearing. 183 The parents proceeded to file, on their own behalf and on
behalf of their son, a complaint in federal district court. 184 The district court granted
the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and held that the defendants had
provided a free appropriate education for the Winklemans' son, Jacob. 185  The
Winklemans filed an appeal, without an attorney, to the Sixth Circuit. 186 The Sixth
Circuit rejected the notion that the IDEA allows non-lawyer parents to proceed pro se.
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit held that right to FAPE rests with a child alone, not to
both the child and his parents. 187  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit ruled that parents
bringing IDEA claims could not appear on their own behalf, nor litigate their child's
claims without an attorney. 188 Because the Sixth Circuit's ruling directly conflicted
with the First Circuit's ruling on the issue as to whether a non-lawyer parent of a child
with a disability may assert IDEA claims pro se, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to the parents in Winkleman. 189
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and found in favor of the parents.
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, concluded that the "IDEA grants
parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights ... encompass the entitlement to
a free appropriate public education for the parents' child." 190 Furthermore, in enforcing
these rights, parents could proceed pro se. The Court held: "Parents enjoy rights under
IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own
behalf." 191  The Court refrained from deciding the second issue in the case as to
whether parents could proceed pro se on behalf of their children. 
192
The holding that parents may, on their own behalf, assert a claim for denial of
FAPE, may turn out to be something of a hollow victory. While Winkleman entitles
parents to a new right, it also opens a legal trap door: pro se representation. Pro se
representation carries with it a host of pitfalls and unintended consequences. Parents
choosing to enforce their own rights on their own behalf will no doubt be up against
experienced legal counsel for the school district. In unmatched contests, parents face a
real prospect of losing more often than winning, as the Winklemans did in this case.
The difficulties are considerable, especially under the Schaeffer holding, which lay the
burden of persuasion on the parents in any challenge to a district's recommendation. 193
Moreover, pro se representation will only extend the time line for resolution of the
underlying dispute with potential negative impact on the child who is caught in the
dispute. If parents represent themselves to enforce their right to the child's FAPE, and
in the meantime do not pull their child out of the school for private placement (in itself a




186. Winkleman, 127 S. Ct. at 1998.
187. Id. at 1999 (citing Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (2005)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2005.
191. Id. at 2006.
192. Winldeman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007.
193. See Schaeffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005)
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navigate through the court system. Accordingly, the practical implications of the
Winkleman decision are unclear. 
194
VI. DISCUSSION
As the above description illustrates, parental rights have evolved considerably since
the EAHCA's enactment in 1975. In addition, it is clear that the rights parents enjoy
today are significantly greater than those enjoyed by parents of children with disabilities
educated under the earliest iteration of the Act. As mentioned earlier, the rights enjoyed
by parents fall into four general areas: notice, consent, participation, and complaint.
Using those four broad categories, Table 1 delineates the rights currently enjoyed by
parents.
194. The Court also recently issued a per curiam decision in Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007).
The Court was evenly divided with Justice Kennedy electing not to participate. Therefore, the decision of the
Second Circuit was affirmed without discussion. The question before the Court was whether a child must first
be enrolled in a public school in order for the parents to collect reimbursement for private school tuition costs
even if the parents prevail in a due process hearing that alleges that the public school district failed to make
FAPE available. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, taking the side of the parents, ruled that parents' right
to receive reimbursement was still available if they could demonstrate that the IEP offered would not provide
FAPE. However, since the Supreme Court's decision sets no precedent beyond the Second Circuit, it is not
included in this analysis.
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Table 1: Current Parental Rights under the IDEA
Parents have the right to...
Notice Provisions: M Receive written notice of their rights under the law
a Receive written notice of the school's intent to evaluate for
special education services
0 Receive written notice of whenever the school initiates a
change of placement or refuses to make a change of
placement
Consent Provisions: * Grant or deny permission to evaluate their child
* Grant or deny permission to provide special education and
related services to their child
Participation M Be a member of any Individualized Education Program
Provisions: (IEP) Team for their child
0 Have access to all records about their child
a Have all evaluation results explained to them
0 Participate in all decisions about their child
0 Receive copies of evaluations and IEPs regarding their
child
0 Receive information about child's progress
M Have information they have independently gathered
considered by school officials
0 Invite persons of their choosing to meetings called to
discuss the child and plan for the child
M Obtain independent evaluation of their child at school
expense when they disagree with the school's evaluation
results
Complaint * Be offered mediation at school expense as means to settle a
Provisions: dispute with the school
0 Challenge school's decisions in front of an impartial
hearing officer
0 Appeal the decision of the hearing officer in state court or
federal district court
0 Receive reimbursement of attorney's fees and educational
costs if the district fails to provide an appropriate education
Analysis of the various legislative revisions and judicial interpretations that resulted in
the evolution of listed rights suggests that parental rights under the IDEA appear to have
had two zeniths: one legislative and one judicial.
To examine the legislative revisions to parental rights, Table 2 (see Appendix A)
provides a side-by-side comparison of parental rights and their treatment under each
version of what is now the IDEA. As indicated, changes in the law and regulations
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sometimes enhanced parental rights, limited parental rights, had a mixed effect, or had a
neutral effect. To summarize those changes, Table 3 reports only the number of
provisions that changed with regard to the four domains of parental rights prescribed by
the EAHCA (notice, consent, participation, and complaint) and whether those changes
were positive (+), negative (-), mixed (+/-) or neutral (0).
Table 3: Effect of Statutory & Regulatory Revisions on Parental Rights
HCPA IDEA 1990 IDEA 1997 IDEA 2004
+ +/- 0 + +/- 0 + - +/- 0 + - +/- 0
Notice 3 1
Provisions
Consent 2 1 1 1
Provisions
Participation 10 2 7 1 5 2
Provisions
Complaint 1 1 2 1 1 5 2
Provisions
Totals 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 14 4 1 8 3 11 2 2
As this tabulation shows, with the notable exception of the addition of the
attorneys' fee provision in the HCPA, little substantive change occurred until 1997. In
addition, Table 3 demonstrates that the 1997 revisions contained numerous provisions
that could be read to augment parental rights. As such, the passage of IDEA 1997 may
be seen as the high point of congressional action that can be said to champion parental
rights. In contrast, IDEA 2004 appears to have the overall effect of restraining the
rights gained in earlier provisions as parental rights were significantly diminished from
the 1997 version.
Turning to judicial activity, the ten decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court
regarding the educational rights of children with disabilities and their parents under the
federal disability law also implicated parental rights in meaningful ways. Table 4




Table 4: Supreme Court Decisions in Relation to Parental Rights
Results Favoring Results Favoring Schools
Parental Rights
Board of Education v. * Established centrality FAPE is a "floor of
Rowley (1982) of parental role in opportunity"
[Whether a FAPE decision-making Explicitly states that
required a sign language process educational decisions
interpreter] deserve deference &
established test that
defers
Held for the School District
Irving Independent Read law to require a
School District v. Tatro service whenever it
(1984) could be performed by
[Whether clean someone other than a
intermittent doctor
catheterization was a
related service or was
medically excluded] Held for the Parents
Smith v. Robinson * Determined that parents
(1984) could not recover
[Whether attorneys' fees attorney's fees if they
could be recovered] prevailed in a complaint
that showed school
failed to provide FAPE
* Determined that
administrative remedies
under EAHCA had to be
exhausted before parents
could bring a complaint
to court
Held for the School District
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Results Favoring Results Favoring Schools
Parental Rights
School Committee of Determined that
Burlington v. parents could recover
Department of private school costs
Education (1985) including tuition, if
[Whether parents could they prevailed in a
recover tuition costs if complaint that showed
private school enrollment school failed to
occurred because school provide FAPE
denied FAPE]
Held for the Parents
Honig v. Doe (1988) * Refused to read the Specifically suggested
[Whether due process law to include an that schools could use
protections applied in the exception to court injunctions to
case of disciplinary procedural remove students deemed
removals] requirements when a "dangerous"
student is "dangerous"
Held for the Parents
Florence County School * Determined that Noted that reductions
District Four v. Carter parents could recover could be made for
(1993) private school costs tuition costs deemed
[Whether parents could including tuition, if "unreasonable" by the
recover tuition costs if they prevailed in a court
private school was not complaint that showed
"approved" by the state] school failed to
provide FAPE and the
school they selected
was appropriate even
if not approved by the
state
Held for the Parents
Cedar Rapids v. Garret 0 Reiterated bright-line
F. (1999) doctor/no-doctor test
[Whether one-to-one from Tatro
nursing services were M Refused to consider
required as a related cost in the calculation
service or was medically of whether a service
excluded] could be medically
excluded
Held for the Parents
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Results Favoring Results Favoring Schools
Parental Rights
Schaffer v. Weast (2005) Established that the
[Whether the parents or burden of persuasion
the school bore the rests with the party
burden of persuasion challenging the decision
regarding appropriateness
of an IEP] Held for the School District
Arlington Central * Determined that parents
School Dist. v. Murphy could not recover expert
(2006) fees if they prevailed in
[Whether expert witness a complaint that showed
fees could be recovered if school failed to provide
parents prevail] FAPE
Held for the School District
Winkleman v. Parma Parents enjoy rights
City School District under IDEA and may
(2007) prosecute these rights
[Whether nonlawyer pro se
parents have an
enforceable right under
the IDEA which they
may prosecute pro se] Held for Parents
As the table shows, six of the ten decisions held for the parents. It also shows that
two of the three most recent decisions have held for school districts against parents.
Examining the cases, their outcomes and their impact suggests that the Court's decision
in Carter marks a judicial zenith for parental rights. It is the last decision to
substantively expand parental rights. While Garret and Winkleman both ruled in
parents' favor, neither did so dramatically. Garret merely reiterated the test set forth in
Tatro, while Winkleman's extension of the ability to appear pro se has the practical
limitations outlined above. In contrast, Schaffer and Murphy can be read to have the
effect of limiting parents' ability to advocate for their children in more dramatic and
generally applicable ways.
To fully understand the import of this narrowing of parental rights under the IDEA,
it is also necessary to examine the intersection of the IDEA with the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB). 195 In light of the NCLB's emphasis on parental rights 196 and
empowerment, this analysis presents something of a paradox. The central assertion in
this paper-that parental rights under the IDEA reached judicial and legislative zeniths
195. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in scattered portions of 20 U.S.C.); 20 U.S.C.
6301 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
196. See Four Pillars of NCLB, available at http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2007).
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and have begun to wane-appears contrary to a main thrust of the NCLB. The power
the NCLB seemingly confers upon parents to direct their children's education is a
foundational "pillar" of that legislation. 197 How can this purported empowerment be
reconciled with the suggestion that parental rights under the IDEA have diminished
from their zenith?
A careful consideration of the parental rights under both IDEA and NCLB shows
that limitations on parental rights outlined in this paper effectively undermine any real
or imagined power the NCLB may offer parents of special education students. This
result occurs because provisions under the IDEA outlined in this paper more directly
affect individual students and parents, whereas the NCLB empowerment provisions are
more systemic in nature. Indeed, the IDEA's limits on parental involvement strike at
the core of parents' ability to affect substantive delivery of an education to their
individual child. In contrast, the NCLB's "empowering" provisions have a larger, more
systemic goal that may or may not affect parents' ability to leverage school districts to
pursue parental interpretations of FAPE.
To understand this phenomenon it is first necessary to comprehend the NCLB
provisions that can be read to empower parents. First the NCLB's emphasis on school
accountability is intended to vest parents with additional rights over the direction of
their child's public education. Increased parental oversight and control is a guiding
principle of the law.198  President Bush made this point literally moments before
signing the legislation into law when he said,
There must be a moment in which parents can say, "I've had enough of this school."
Parents must be given real options in the face of failure in order to make sure reform
is meaningful. And so, therefore, the bill's second principle is, is that we trust parents
to make the right decisions for their children. Any school that doesn't perform, any
school that cannot catch up and do its job, a parent will have these options: a better
school, a tutor, or a charter school. 199
In sum, achieving the NCLB's promise of improving student performance by 2014
is closely linked to increased parental involvement and power.
200
There are a number of provisions embedded in the NCLB that appear to strengthen
parental rights. 20 1 The most potent of these permits parents to transfer their child from
a failing school into a school or district that is satisfying state standards. 20 2 In brief,
under the structure of the NCLB, states create proficiency standards that all schools
must satisfy by 2014. 203 In addition, each school must demonstrate that all pupils are
making adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward realization of universal proficiency
each school year. If a school does not satisfy these standards for two consecutive years,
197. See id.
198. See Statement by President of the United States, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1614, 1615 (Jan. 8, 2002).
199. Id. at 1616-17.
200. Id.
201. For an outline of the major provisions of NCLB, see Perry A. Zirkle, Commentary, NCLB: What does
it mean for Students with Disabilities?, 185 EDUC. LAW REP. 805 (2004).
202. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. pt. 200 (2002).
203. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(E)-(H) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
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parents may transfer their child to a school within the district or, in some
circumstances, 204 to other districts, that are making AYP. 205  Further, parents also
enjoy the fight to supplemental services, free of charge, in the event that their child's
school fails to make AYP for a third consecutive year.206 Thus, it would appear that the
NCLB actually expands parental rights in one very significant way: Ultimately, it could
provide parents the option of choosing a school for their child and, at the very least,
provides parents some discretion to enlist supplemental services and outside educational
providers-but only for those parents with children enrolled in schools deemed in need
of improvement for two or more consecutive years.
In other respects, the NCLB also appears to confer parental rights. Safety
provisions in the law afford parents additional rights of school choice in schools that are
considered dangerous environments. For example, parents may exercise the option of
transferring their child from a school when that school is deemed dangerous or the child
has been a victim of violent crime.207 Furthermore, the NCLB contains sections that
establish parental rights to be involved in the programmatic workings of Title I
programs. 208 Finally, schools are required to apprise parents of their AYP standing
209
and the qualifications of the staff with respect to the highly certified teacher
requirements of the NCLB. 2 10 These "sunshine" provisions appear to be in accord with
President Bush's attempt to use the NCLB to increase parental power and oversight
authority to direct their child's public education. 2 11  This perceived expansion of
parental rights appears to contrast the general trend identified here that such rights, at
least with respect to parents of special education students, are being diminished. How
does one explain the seemingly contradictory trend?
The answer appears to lie in the distinction between individual and systemic
accountability. The NCLB's parental rights provisions provide little, if any, insulation
from restrictions on rights of special education parents that have resulted from judicial
interpretations of the IDEA and its most recent reauthorization. Specifically, the
diminishment of parental rights under the IDEA that have most recently manifested in
Schaeffer, Murphy and IDEA 2004 constrain any advocacy power that may be conferred
to parents under the NCLB. Notwithstanding the fact that special education parents
may choose, in certain cases, their child's school placement under the NCLB's
accountability structure, they are in no better position in controlling their child's day-to-
day special education services. The exercise of parental strength in the "trenches"-at
IEP meetings or in administrative hearings-continues to be governed by the limitations
on parental rights as outlined in this paper.
204. Id. § 6316(b)( 11). To the extent practicable, school districts are authorized to establish a cooperative
agreement with other districts that would permit students to transfer from failing school districts into districts
that are satisfying AYP. If no agreement exists, a student would not be permitted to transfer.
205. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(l)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
206. Id. § 6316(b)(6)-(10), (e).
207. See id. § 7912.
208. See id. § 6318(a)(2), (c)-(e).
209. See id. § 6311 (h)(1)(B)(ii).
210. See 20 U.S.C. § 631 l(h)(2)(B), (h)(2)(E) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
211. See supra note 197, at 1616. ("No longer is it acceptable to hide poor performance. No longer is it
acceptable to keep results from parents.")
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The Supreme Court's Schaffer and Murphy decisions underscore the notion that the
NCLB's choice provisions are limited by a restriction of parental power under special
education law. A hypothetical example illustrates this point. Assuming parents have a
child receiving special education services in a school that fails to meet AYP, the family
now seeks to exercise the right under the NCLB to remove their child from a failing
school to a school that is meeting AYP in the district. Such parents have utilized the
most extreme right they have under the NCLB. Still, while the new school succeeds as
a whole based on objective measurements and state standards, if the parents become
unsatisfied with the programming needs for their particular child's special education,
they stand in no better stead vis-A-vis the IEP process than they would have been absent
the NCLB provisions. At this point in the hypothetical, when substantive disputes
concerning particular special education needs and services bubble to the surface,
limitations on parental advocacy kick in, even in a context where parents have exercised
their most powerful right under the NCLB. The same limitations on their rights that
would have operated in their child's "failing" school, limit their power in the
"successful" school. Indeed, their newly minted right to choose a "passing" school
under the NCLB does nothing to enhance their advocacy power under the IDEA.
For example, under Schaeffer, the hypothetical parents bear the burden of
persuasion to show the proposed IEP is inadequate. 212 Further, the family may enjoy
the right to mount experts to persuade the decision-maker and satisfy their burden, but
this effort is not without cost. Under the rule in Murphy, even if they prevail, they will
not recover expert fees. 2 13 To be sure, parents may be able and willing to pay expert
fees and bear their burden. However, it is reasonable to assume that the prospect of
paying those fees, even when they believe they will prevail, will give pause to parents
as they consider taking legal action. Furthermore, even under Winkleman, parents may
assert their own rights under the IDEA pro se, but as this paper points out, pro se
litigation is problematic.
Still, it could be argued that the NCLB's accountability provisions create a press for
what may be called systemic appropriateness. In other words, since FAPE, by
definition, is necessary for an individual child with a disability to receive meaningful
educational benefit, then FAPE for each individual child with a disability in a given
school becomes the necessary predicate for the school to achieve AYP under the NCLB.
While ensuring that FAPE is provided for each child does not ensure that AYP will be
met, providing something less than FAPE for one or more children would likely
undermine that objective. 2 14 As such, regardless of whether a child's parents assert the
rights they enjoy to challenge an insufficient IEP or placement, NCLB's accountability
demands may create an additional incentive for the system to get it right, so to speak.
212. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
213. Murphy, 548 U.S. at 29.
214. This raises another interesting issue at the intersection of IDEA and the NCLB. Recall that if parents
refuse consent to provide initial services, the school district is prohibited from challenging the decision. This
parental decision effectively hampers a school's efforts to help the child obtain meaningful educational
benefit, yet the school is still held accountable for that child's progress under the AYP provisions of NCLB.
In other words, if school officials are right and the child should be receiving special education in order to
achieve FAPE, but are prohibited from providing those services by the parents, it raises an issue of




Accordingly, even if parental rights to advocate for their child under the IDEA appear
constrained in relation to previous versions of the Act, the requirements schools face to
demonstrate instructional effectiveness under the NCLB may mitigate the need to assert
those rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
Children with disabilities are part of the "public" served by the country's public
schools. Delivery of educational services is largely governed by federal disability law,
in particular, the IDEA. Parents' rights to be informed, consent to special treatment,
participate in decision making and challenge the system whenever they believe their
child has been denied equal educational opportunity are important means of holding
schools accountable for meeting the needs of children with disabilities.
While this paper traced the evolution of those rights to the present day, it is by no
means a complete process. Considerable judicial activity continues with respect to the
IDEA and schools' obligations to the children they serve. In addition to this pending
judicial activity, it is likely that legislative action will continue to develop the contours
of the rights enjoyed by parents as they advocate for their children with disabilities.
Major parent and education organizations routinely lobby Congress and the Department
of Education to consider altering the language or interpretation of the IDEA. For
example, the Department of Education reported that 5500 separate parties
(organizations and individuals) submitted comments through the formal rule-making
process after proposed regulations were published in the Federal Register.
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As this iterative process continues, this study raises several questions. Will parents
see their rights to advocate for their children with disabilities continue to diminish
through subsequent legislative and judicial action? How will a narrowing of parental
rights affect parental influence in the educational opportunities and results enjoyed by
their children? Will any of the recent judicial interpretations spur Congress to revisit
the law to correct decisions they or their constituents find inequitable? Will the pending
reauthorization of the NCLB alter parents' rights as advocates? And most importantly,
will the system of parents' procedural rights created by the IDEA provide sufficient
protection for children with disabilities such that the IDEA realizes its primary purpose
"to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living"? 
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215. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children
with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540; 46,547 (2006).




Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Receive written notice of their Receive written notice of the
on parental rights under the law school's intent to evaluate for





EAHCA 1975 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
HCPA 1986 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
IDEA 1990 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory and Regulatory New Statutory & Regulatory
language that specifies both the language that specifies both the
content of the notice in detail content of the notice in detail
and the circumstances when and the circumstances when
notice must be provided and notice must be provided (+)
requires that the rights be
written in a parent friendly
language (+)
IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory and Regulatory
language reduces the number of
times when parents must be




Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Receive written notice of Grant or deny permission to
on parental whenever the school initiates evaluate their child.
rights a change of placement or




EAHCA 1975 Statute Regulations
Regulations
HCPA 1986 Statute Regulations
Regulations
IDEA 1990 Statute Regulations
Regulations New Language that specifies
override procedures if consent
is denied (-)
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory language that
codifies previous regulatory
language (0)




Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Grant or deny permission to Be a member of any
on parental provide special education and Individualized Education
rights related services to their child Program (IEP) Team for




EAHCA 1975 Regulations Statute
Regulations
HCPA 1986 Regulations Statute
Regulations
IDEA 1990 Regulations Statute
New Language that specifies Regulations
override procedures if consent
is denied (-)
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory language New statutory and regulatory
specifies that consent must be language:
given-a codification of earlier - makes clear that parents
regulations (0) must be involved and lists
New regulatory language them first (+)
becomes silent on override M requires a regular educator
procedure if consent is denied on most IEP teams (+)
(+)
IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory and Regulatory New Statutory and Regulatory
language explicitly states that language:
school officials may not use * allows some IEP Team
any administrative procedures
to override refusal to consent to
initial services (+) parents approve in writing.(+/-)
* allows IEPs to be amended
without a full meeting (+/-)





Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Have access to all records Have all evaluation results






EAHCA 1975 Regulations Regulations
HCPA 1986 Regulations Regulations
IDEA 1990 Regulations Regulations
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New language codifies former New language codifies former
regulatory language (0) regulatory language (0)
IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
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Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Participate in all decisions Receive copies of evaluations






EAHCA 1975 Statute Regulations
Regulations
HCPA 1986 Statute Regulations
Regulations
IDEA 1990 Statute Regulations
Regulations
Journal of Legislation
Key: Impact Participate in all decisions Receive copies of evaluations








New Language specifies that
the copy should be provided at






" makes clear that parents
must be involved in
placement decisions (0)
" establishes a legal
presumption of placement
in regular education (+)
" codifying Honig, grants
school officials unilateral
authority to remove a child
for up to 10 days as a
disciplinary consequence
(0)
" grants school officials
unilateral authority to
remove a child for guns,
other weapons, or drugs (-)
" describes a procedure for
removing a child deemed
"dangerous" (-)





* makes clear that charter





Key: Impact Participate in all decisions Receive copies of evaluations






IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New language:
" removes legal presumption
of a relationship between
the misbehavior and
disability (-)
" adds serious bodily injury
to the list of offenses for
which school officials have
unilateral authority to order
long term removals (-)
" specifies that 45-day
removals may now be




with private schools about
procedures including the




Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Receive information about Have information they have
on parental child's progress independently gathered





EAHCA 1975 Statute Regulations
Regulations
HCPA 1986 Statute Regulations
Regulations
IDEA 1990 Statute Regulations
Regulations
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Language requires: New statutory language:
" "measurable" annual goals - codifies older language (0)
(+) and
" participation on statewide 0 makes clear that an
and district-wide evaluation must gather
assessments (+) parental input (+)
* that parents of children
with disabilities be given
information on student




IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New language:
" that drops requirement of
progress reports as often as
non-disabled children (-)
" eliminates requirement for





Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Invite persons of their Obtain independent
on parental choosing to meetings called to evaluation of their child at
rights discuss the child and plan for school expense when they




EAHCA 1975 Regulations Statute
Regulations
HCPA 1986 Regulations Statute
Regulations
IDEA 1990 Regulations Statute
Regulations
IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Statutory language New Regulatory Language
codifies former regulatory delineates what happens if
language (0) district challenges parents' right
to have an independent
evaluation (0)




Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Be offered mediation at Challenge school's decisions
on parental school expense as means to in front of an impartial











IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New provision that adds the New Statutory language that
right to mediation as an specifies what must be in a
alternative to due process (+/-) parental complaint (-)
IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New Language about New language:
settlement agreements and their . requiring a resolution
enforceability (+) session before proceeding
(-)
" sets a 2-year statute of
limitations on complaints(-)
" establishing hearing officer
requirements (0)
" requiring that any
procedural errors must
deny FAPE in order for
parents to prevail (-)
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Table 2: Comparison of Parental Rights under Each Iteration of the IDEA
(EAHCA)
Key: Impact Appeal the decision of the Receive reimbursement of
on parental hearing officer in state court attorney's fees and
rights or federal district court educational costs if the






HCPA 1986 Statute Statute
Regulations Addition of Provision for
Recovery of Attorney's Fees
(+)




IDEA 1997 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New statutory language
establishes some limits on
when parents may collect fees.
(-)
IDEA 2004 Statute Statute
Regulations Regulations
New language:
" codifies that tuition costs
may be reimbursed if
parents prevail (0)
" limits reimbursement of
tuition if parents do not
give 10-day notice (-)
" specifies that courts may
order parents to pay state
costs in frivolous
complaints (-)
20081
